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Introduction
Financial globalization still falls short of universally promoting growth and welfare. This holds especially true for developing countries (see e.g. Prasad et al. (2007) ), but stands in sharp contrast to the predictions of economic theory. In this paper I extend the theory to argue that if capital market integration leads to inows of foreign capital as predicted, this crowds out domestic investment and that this harms long-run growth perspectives in developing countries. Agosin & Machado (2005) provide evidence that crowding out is indeed a major result of FDI in developing countries. Even though this eect may appear obvious (especially to non-scientic critics of globalization), neoclassical theory can not account for this. Conventional models rather make the opposite prediction. If higher returns to capital in capital-scarce countries drive capital ows, then, in static models, the increase in wage income outweighs the losses for domestic capital. In dynamic models, where lowered returns to capital may decrease (relative) savings and investment initially, this logic still holds. Thus, in a steady state of equalized capital stocks, there is no reason why investment should not turn domestic. Assuming perfect capital markets, there is no dierence in returns between saving and investment throughout the growth process in these models. Capital market integration then only accelarates the growth process by raising the capital stock immediately (see e.g. Barro et al. (1995) ) I introduce a model where capital markets are not perfect and investment yields a higher return than saving. The possibility to invest depends both on own income and on the prospective returns of investment. Then, rstly, potential entrepreneurs in poorer countries can largely not invest themselves because they cannot obtain the necessary credit to pursue investment. Secondly, foreign investment decreases this possibility further because it decreases the prospective returns. Even though short term gains in terms of increased wage incomes are realized, in the long run, capital income remains lost out as income dierences prevail, one determining the other. In autarky, when domestic savings slowly nance a building up of domestic investment (by 'trickle-down'), it would have taken longer to reach the steady state, but domestic capital income would have been higher -by exactly the amount that leaves the country as foreign capital returns. Whereas in a closed economy savings nd their way into investment, in open markets, the savings that cannot be invested by domestic agents will ow out of the developing country as nancial capital. At the same time, direct investment by foreign entrepreneurs will enter in return. This structure of two-way capital ows is indeed what we observe in the world economy. Table   1 illustrates this pattern. Aggregately, in contrast to the discussion that is inuenced mainly by the Chinese position, capital is not owing from South to
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North, but rather still exactly in the direction that neoclassical theory would suggest. However, reverse ows tend to almost net out this entry. This does not only constitute a novel argument with regard to the Lucas (1990) -Puzzle, but also elemantarily contributes to the discussion about global imbalances.
The general structure of two-way capital ows has empirically rst been identied by Ju & Wei (2010) . To explain this, they provide a static model based on imperfect capital markets, in which dierences in the quality of institutions are the main driver of nancial capital outows. I, in contrast,
show that even when an international capital market is of equal conditions for all countries, the interaction between countries which are only diering in their incomes generates this outcome. 1 Matsuyama (2004) has shown that same-market interaction between rich and poor countries may manifest international inequality because poorer countries fall behind in competition for credit. 2 He only considers an international market for nancial capital, excluding FDI. 3 I will borrow his specication of imperfect capital markets but consider the role of FDI in a more elaborated setting of international capital markets.
Even though Ju & Wei (2010) incorporate FDI, by not taking a growth perspective, their model assigns it no specic role in determining the growth 1 elsoD euse the nlysis undertken here tkes into ount the role of individul gentsD s do not hve to ssume onvex osts of investment to otin n interior solutionF 2 wtsuym @PHHRA in turnD is sed on the seminl work of qertler 8 ogo' @IWWHA nd tht of foyd 8 mith @IWWUAF 3 sn ftD llowing for phs in wtsuym @PHHRA9s model would mke the entire mehE nism rek downF characteristics of developing countries other than the standard neoclassical one. In particular, it does not inuence the investment opportunities of domestic agents. 4 Other than these two papers, I do especially analyze the role of FDI as a hinderance for development. Therefore, this paper is related to the works of Grossman (1984) and Reis (2001) , who comment on how FDI might slow down domestic entrepreneurial activity. Both results complement the argument made here, but stress dierent mechanisms. The former argues that possible entrepreneurs in developing countries prefer to leave the risk of investment to foreign investors and instead work in foreign companies for lower, but safe wage income. Risk sharing is no objective in my model, which implies that agents would prefer, but are hindered, to become entrepreneurs. The resulting welfare losses in the economy opening up are thus absent in Grossman (1984) . Reis (2001) on the other hand shows in a model of endogenous growth that the exogenous technological advantage of foreign rms may crowd out domestic research activities in partial equilibrium, so that the prots that accrue to these activities and that escape the country by repatriation may mirror domestic welfare losses. However, in her model, the countries dier in their technological characteristics and the capital market is restricted to direct investment.
I show the eect of a reduction of domestic entrepreneurial activity in a general equilibrium model of complete -and same -market interaction that deliberately stays as close to neoclassical growth theory as possible. I thereby deliver a tractable way to identify why -in contrast to conventional arguments -it could be disadvantegeaous for developing countries to have substantial shares of GDP leave the country as foreign factor payments such that GNI is lower than the domestic value of production. This pattern holds true for almost all developing countries.
I do not consider other eects of FDI than the increase in the domestic capital stock which are often attributed to it, such as technological or competitioninduced spillover eects (see e.g. de Mello (1997) for an overview). The reason is twofold: First, a metastudy by Harrison & Rodriguez-Clare (2009) concludes the empirical evidence on these two be negligable at best. Second, and more importantly, I want to highlight one specic eect of FDI, abstracting from everything else that may well be considered additionally.
Even if positive eects may be present, the mechanism presented here should help answering the question why especially FDI still has a negative eect on welfare in developing countries. There is not much conclusive evidence on this direct link, but the one that exists (Kose et al. (2009 ), Herzer (2012 ) makes a strong point for this negative relationship.
In the following, I will show how the structure of capital ows and growth characteristics simultaneously determine one another, putting the eects of capital market integration between rich and poor countries in a new perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and section 3 lays out how the growth and trickle down process in this economy emerges in autarky. Section 4 shows how this process is interrupted by the opening up of the economy to world capital markets and section 5 discusses the resulting structure of capital ows. Some extensions are briey presented in section 6: Section 6.1 lays out a two-country setting and 6.2 shows how the result is magnied when dierences in total factor productivity between countries are accounted for. Section 7 concludes.
The model
The model is based on the one of growth under imperfect capital markets from Matsuyama (2004) , but alters the basic framework to analyse the effects of FDI in particular instead of only looking at the eect of competition for credit. 5 Consider an economy that is made up by a homogeneous population of unit mass. Agents are innitely lived. Individuals are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and each agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically. There is only one good produced, used for consumption and investment. Production follows standard neoclassical patterns:
where K t and L t are aggregate supplies of capital and labor in period t. F is a constant returns to scale production function and L = 1 such that production equals per capita production and can be expressed as y t = f (k t ), lower case notation indicating per capita variables. Furthermore, f (k) > 0 > f (k). Inada conditions 5 he entrl results in the utrky se therefore resemle the one in wtsuym @PHHRAF he sitution under open mrketsD howeverD looks fundmentlly di'erent here ompred to the one in his settingF hold. However, since we will have to make a statement about the characteristics of growth over history, suppose that f (0) = , with small, but greater zero.
The labor market is competetive and labor is paid its marginal product,
. Invested capital receives the residual of production, which is, per invested unit of capital,
implies that a greater capital stock decreases per unit capital returns and increases wages.
For simplicity, capital depreciates fully after one period. 6 Agents save -in a Solow-type way -a constant fraction s of their income. 7 They can transfer their savings to the next period by either lending it on the competetive market for credit, earning the gross return of r t+1 , or by investing it: If investing, each agent can run exactly one investment project by investing exactly 1 unit of capital into the joint production process. This restricts in both directions: First of all, investment is indivisible, i.e. there is a threshold of funds that have to be brought into each single investment. This will lead to competition on the market for credit in the rst place. Secondly, this is the most extreme, but also most tractable form of individually diminishing returns to investment. If they weren't, the richest individual would always be able to attract all credit, as we will see. Both, indivisibility and diminishing returns, are in their extreme form a simplication and only introduced as such for tractability, but both in general are essential for the mechanism to be at work.
If an individual i wants to invest, but her funds -which equal her savings -are not sucient to ensure investment, she has to borrow the remaining share, 1 − sI i t , on the credit market in order to invest one unit in physical capital in t + 1. She then earns the return on her investment, has to repay her credit taken (if any), and also receives the wage payment on her labor
supplied. An entrepreneur's income in period t + 1 then reads:
6 his emphsizes the ft tht diret investment is not just 9erlier9 nd thus rowds out domesti investment lter onD ut tht investment hnes re struturlly reduedF 7 his ould esily e motivted y n yvqEwodel with logEpreferenes nd wrmEglow9 equests or simply s dynstyEmodel s in wtsuym @PHIIAF foth would not hnge the results qulittivelyF If she instead lends her savings, she receives the credit market return on her savings and wage income and her income is given by:
(1) can be rearranged to:
Thus, an individual will always be willing to invest if
Because this does not depend on individual characteristics, this is also the condition for any investment to take place. We refer to this as the Profitability Constraint (PC). All individuals additionally underlie a borowing constraint (BC), however. This takes the form:
This capital market imperfection lies in the heart of our analysis. It sais that an individual with income I i t can only pledge a share λ of the prospective return to her investment (LHS) on her payback (RHS). 8 This has two implications: First, ceteris paribus, an individual with a lower income has less collateral to bring in the investment, thus has to raise more credit and consequently nds it harder to warrant for the high repayment by the return to investment, i.e. have the condition satised. Secondly, a higher capital stock decreases the prospective returns and thus the probability of everyone to be eligable for credit. λ < 1 is a measure of credit market imperfection.
If (4) holds with inequality, i.e. if physical investment is more protable than lending, everyone would like to invest rather than lend on the credit market.
As long as agents can do so, this investment decreases the left hand side of both, (4) and (5). Therefore, for a given r t+1 , either one will bind to`stop' investment. The borrowing constraint will be binding as long as
8 wtsuym @PHHRAD pFVTHfD rgues tht this form of orrowing onstrint stnds in line with most mirofoundtions of pitl mrket imperfetions tht n e found in the litertureF for some individual i. 9 We will restrict ourselves in what follows to the case that this holds, which is equivalent to saying that the borrowing constraint (5) is always binding for some agents and the protability constraint holds with inequality, i.e. investment is strictly protable. 10 Those agents (we will introduce the reason for ex post income heterogeneity later) which have to borrow only so little that investment can guarantee repayment, will borrow on the credit market and invest their savings and credit in physical capital and become entrepreneurs, all others will lend their savings as credit. If an entrepreneur has so many funds, that these suce for investment alone, she will make the investment and lend the remaining savings on the credit market, which also results in an entrepreneur's income given by (3). 11
How is equilibrium in the credit market, i.e. r t+1 obtained? Incomes in period t are given by the current capital stock(s). Now, because s is exogenous, savings are given. They can only be invested or lent on the credit market, to again be borrowed by other agents to be invested. Thus, these savings will constitute the capital stock in the next period k t+1 .
W.l.o.g., order the agents increasing in their income, such that I i t is increasing in i. Now, we deneĩ t as the agent which can just pledge investment, i.e.
for whom the borrowing constraint (5) is exactly binding for a given r t+1 .
Denote her critical incomeĨ t , which is the income that just suces such that (5) holds with equality:
All agents i <ĩ cannot invest, all agents i ≥ĩ can. It means that agents with a lower income and hence less colteral lend their savings, all those who can self-nance a larger share of investment will be able to invest. The lenders' savings, however, make up the supply side on the credit market, whereas the investors' borrowing represents the demand for credit. The former is hence increasing, the latter decreasing inĩ. In equilibrium both have to equal, such 9 o e extD it hs to ind for the ritil gent s de(ned elowF his will in equilirium e equl to the lowest inomeD mking the two sttements equivlentF 10 xoteD tht this is di'erent to wtsuym @PHHRA9s nlysis where n interior solution n only exist if the ro(tility gonstrint is inding in the riher ountriesF fy utting intertemporl links in individul inomesD he does not ount for ex post heterogeneity etween gents within ountriesD whih hnges the interprettionF 11 e will still refer to suh n gent s 9entrepreneur9 rther thn 9lender9F
This is illustrated by gure 1(a). Because ∂Ĩt ∂r t+1
> 0, to thisĩ, there corresponds exactly one r t+1 . With a lower r t+1 , more agents would demand credit (and less would supply), driving the interest rate up, and vice versa.
An alternative way of representation is hence that all savings have to be invested, such that k t+1 = 1 −ĩ(r t+1 ). The richest individuals will invest and the interest rate adjusts accordingly. This is illustrated by gure 1(b).
As we will see in what follows, the income distribution may have at parts.
If this is the case atĩ t , some agents of those of equal income are credit rationed.
The equilibrium interest rate is then given by
From this, we see that the credit market imperfection implies that there is a wedge between the equilibrium interest rate and the return to physical investment, the latter being greater by 1−sĨt λ , as long as the borrowing constraint is binding.
Autarky Dynamics
It follows from the above analysis that in autarky all domestic savings in period t are invested in physical capital, i.e. sf (k t ) = k t+1 -either directly by the saver or via lending. The interest rate r t+1 will adjust such that all savings nd an investor. Thus, for the aggregate economy, Solow-type growth emerges, irrespective of the capital market imperfection. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics.
When k t+1 is given, so is f (k t+1 ). Since every agent can invest only one unit of capital, the share of entrepreneurs in period t + 1 is also given by k t+1 .
From (3), the income of an agent who becomes an entrepreneur will exceed that of an agent of same period-before income by exactly the excess prots of physical investment on her invested one unit of capital. She earns the wedge on what she borrows and and receives the higher returns on her own savings. If she can fully self-nance her investment, one unit of her savings is paid o with the higher return and the remainder is lent on the credit market.
Since only the highest income (and thus highest savings) individuals are able to borrow and invest, they must have had a higher income in the period before also and so on. Thus, as long as the aggregate capital stock is increasing -and thus the share of entrepreneurs -an agent who was an entrepreneur the period before will be an entrepreneur in all succeeding periods as well. 12 (2) and (3) imply that the ordering of agents according to their income does not change, due to the deterministic path-dependence of incomes. However, an increasing capital stock implies that in each period additional agents must become entrepreneurs. These must then have been lenders the period before and all periods before that. Figure 3 illustrates the transition and the resulting income distribution.
The interest rate thus has to adjust such that some lenders can become entrepreneurs and that they can just pledge payback by their income. Having only received wage income and saved part of that throughout from the beginning of the growth process, by iterating (2), this income is given by:
which corresponds to an equilibrium interest rate given by (7). In each period, the income of the next`new' entrepreneur xes the interest rate which in turn determines next period's incomes and so on. With an increasing capital stock, also the wage rate increases over time.
Since part of the income is given by savings and the interest rate uctuates over time, depending on the structural form of the production function, it is not at rst sight obvious that an increasing wage also leads to an increasing overall income for lenders. However, we will assume the production function in the relevant range to have this property, which is in line with the empirical evidence. 13
Lemma 1 Assuming the return on physical investment is not too low throughout the growth process, the income of lenders, which is made up by the return 12 yviouslyD there is heterogeneity within the group of entrepreneursD depending on the time tht they hve een investors nd hve reeived the respetive inomeF 13 ee eFgF ghen 8 vllion @PHIHAF on savings plus the wage income, will increase over time, i.e.
For the necessary restrictions on the production function, see Appendix A.
Proof. See Appendix A The intuition behind this is that the rental rate must not decrease so much, that this eats up the increase in the wage income.
The capital income of the individual investor on the other hand decreases over time, but they benet from the increase in the wage rate as well. The result on their overall income is ambiguous. However, more and more agents become entrepreneurs, yielding the higher income compared to that of the lenders.
Aggregate GNI in autarky in period t is given by
This representation emphasizes the fact that in each period the share of entrepreneurs receives an additional income on their invested capital (the terms in the rst line), and all agents get a wage income (second line). All either get return on their saved incomes or need to repay them less, which leads to that all income is discounted through with the respective interest rate of all relevant periods.
Aggregate GN I a t , in autarky, must however be equal to GDP a t = f (k t ). This drives, as already seen, also the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock, described by sf (k t ) = k t+1 .
Steady State
The dynamics implicitly dene the steady state to which the autarky economy converges to, as depicted in gure 2:
In the steady state, the share of entrepreneurs is exactly k * . The respective incomes of each type of agent converge to:
Where again the steady state interest rate is determined by the`newest' entrepreneur's income, which is just given by (11). 14 It will adjust such that all savings can be invested by someone who is able to do so. The steady state level of investment is also unaected by the eectiveness of the credit market imperfection.
Note, that in the steady state, the savings of entrepreneurs cannot alone suce to aord investment, i.e. s f (k * )−r * +w * 1−r * s < 1. If they wouldn't demand credit, savings would be invested by new entrepreneurs.
GNI in the steady state is again equal to GDP, f (k * ), and can be expressed
4 Open Capital Markets
Now, consider a small open economy in the South, which is fully described by the above characteristics, opens up to the world market. To focus on the structural mechanism, assume that all other countries in the world (the North) are of the exactly same type. Especially, the level of capital market imperfection λ is equal in all countries, implying that dierences in the competitiveness on the credit market arise from dierences in incomes solely. 15 The dierence is given only by that they are already more progressed, whereas the opening economy is behind in the process of develop-14 en lterntive wy to look t it would e tht in9 the stedy stteD no new enE trepreneur will emerge ndĨt is the inome of the lst9 entrepreneurF king tht we lwys only pproh the stedy stteD mrginl shres of the popultion will eome new entrepreneurs nd the ritil inome is given y the inome of the lendersF s prefer looking t it the ltter wyD even though it mkes no di'erene for the nlysis undertken hereD the results would e even lerer otherwiseF 15 voosening this ssumption would mgnify the results while mking the weker point tht institutionl di'erenes ount for di'erenes in developmentF he strtion mde here shll distinguish di'erent feture of sme mrket intertionF ment. This is the same as saying that a country in a lower autarky t opens to a world in a higher t. For convenience, we will assume that the world is already in its steady state. This is not crucial, the analysis holds for all cases where a less developed country opens up to a more progressed world. This is then mirrored by a dierence in the relative capital endowment. Denote the given capital ratio in period T by k T for the home country and that of the world k W T = k * , with T being the period of opening up. Opening up now implies two things: First, investors can freely invest in physical capital whereever they wish, investment becoming eective the respective next period. The only restriction is that each investor can only make one indivisible investment and needs to decide where to do so. Secondly, agents can freely lend and borrow at the world market for nancial capital. Lenders receive the world market return r t+1 on their savings. Potential borrowers face this credit cost and face the borrowing constraint which is dependent on the prospective return in the destination of their planned investment decision as well as their individiual incomes.
In period T , all incomes are given by the capital installed and the history of incomes in the closed economy. Because k T < k W T , capital returns in South are higher. Therefore, and because the good is freely shipped, northern investors will for the next period rather invest in the South until returns are equalized such that k T +1 = k W T +1 = k * . Returns depend neither on the individual pursuing the investment nor the destination country, be it home or foreign. Now consider what happens on the market for credit. The world market return to nancial capital is given by r * . Agent i is able to pledge
The world interest rate r * is however determined exactly such that for a lender with steady state income, given by (11), condition (13) However, by lemma 1, income of those that have been lenders until T is strictly lower than in the steady state, L I T < L I * =Ĩ T . Thus, these agents cannot pledge investment for T + 1 at world market conditions. Now, denote the share of those in South that can in T pledge investment for the next period byk T +1 ≡k. By the above argument, at most all past entrepreneurs in T can at world market conditions again become entrepreneurs.
Their number was given by k T , thus the share of entrepreneurs in the opening economy will be smaller than or equal to as it was just before opening up andk
holds. 17 What happens in the following periods? In period T + 1, foreign investment becomes eective and the physical capital stock in the economy is given by k * . The increase in the capital stock raises the wage rate in T + 1 to w * . This is an immediate gain for the entire population and increases the balance sheet for pledging investment for the subsequent periods. But, the income of a lender from period T to period T + 1 in South is given by:
where the latter equality derives from the fact that the income just sucient for pledging investment can be expressed as the wage income in steady state plus the savings on previos income. This is the same for a (new or historic) lender in South, only that her income the period before was lower, and thus are her savings. Consequently her current income in T + 1 is still lower than that of a steady state lender. This on the other hand implies that she can still not pledge investment for period T +2 when facing world market returns to capital. This argument, then, holds for all following periods. Thus, who
could not invest in period T will never be able to invest in future periods and the share of entrepreneurs will not expand over time, being xed at
The trickle-down mechanism is disrupted when the economy 16 feuse returns nd thus investors9 inomes re higher the lower the pitl stokD it is more likely tht it holds for some or even llD the more kwrd the ountry is when opening upF 17 st holds with equlity if ll pst entrepreneurs n eome entrpreneurs in the open eonomyF xoteD tht the timing of investment is not ruil for the resultF opens up to world capital markets. This is illustrated in gure 4 (for the case of all past entrepreneurs being able to borrow internationally).
Especially for low levels of development, the capital inow and concurring increase in the wage rate implies an immediate gain in individual incomes.
But what is happening at the same time is that, due to FDI, the prospective returns for capital decrease so much that the agents in South still cannot pledge investment despite their risen income.
GNI thus also initially increases due to the inow of FDI. It now doesn't have to equal GDP, which immediately jumps to GDP o t = f (k * ) for t > T . GNI, in contrast, is given by
which is the constant capital income of the constant share of investors plus the constant wage payments, each transferred at the same rate throughout time from period T on, plus the remaining savings on income in period T. Figure 5 illustrates the time dynamics of this and contrasts it to the situation in autarky. In autarky, capital would build up slowly, but the share of investors would expand, who would then reap the surplus prots on physical investment. When opening up, capital rushes into the country, but domestic agents will never be able to become entrepreneurs and benet from the gains of capital ownership.
The steady state values for GNI in the respective situations read
Becausek ≤ k T < k * , steady state national income will always be lower when the country has opened up to international markets in the process of development. In the long run, labor income would have been the same. But, in autarky, capital ownership and the concurring prots would be in domestic hands, which they are not if a country integrates into international capital markets. The standard neoclassical result of initial gains due to capital inows is bought at the expense of a disruption in the trickle-down process.
The Structure of Capital Flows
The resulting structure of capital ows in and out of the country is easily analyzed, concentrating on the steady state for exposition. 18 Since the share of domestic investors who each invest 1 unit of capital is lower than the overall capital stock, FDI into the country is positive and given by the dierence of the two:
The outow of nancial capital is given by the dierence in overall savings by domestic agents and what of savings is invested by domestic agents. The latter is just given byk = k * − (k * −k). Savings are the same as in autarky, where they would just constitute steady state capital stock, lowered by the not occuring savings on the missed out returns to physical capital, i.e. by
1−r * s . Financial capital outow as the dierence of these two is thus given by
where the last inequality derives from the fact that savings on capital income in the steady state must be smaller than 1, as shown above. Compared to the autarky steady state, the reduction in savings is not as high as the dierence in investment by domestic agents that is crowded out by foreign investment.
These excess savings ow out of the country via the credit market, to ow back as direct investment.
The aggregate nancial account is given by the dierence between the outow 18 s here tlk out net9 )ows in the sense of net for eh type of pitl )ow E (nnil nd diret investmentF sn the sene of osts to interntionl investmentD ll domesti investors ould invest rod nd ll domesti pitl ould e phsF e simply ssume tht n investor (rst invests t home s long s this yields the sme returnF of nancial capital (17) and FDI-inow (16)
This is exactly the pattern that we see in table 1.
The inow of capital is mirrored by the outow of factor income that shows responsible for lost out welfare in the long run.
Extensions
The basic setting considered so far was a simple and tractable way to isolate the eect of how FDI crowds out domestic investment in developing countries. As that, the equilibrium described has some features that we would not expect to see in the world. That is for example, that with otherwise identical countries, the productive capital stock (although not owned) in the developing is the same as in more developed countries after opening up, and immediately so. As a result, in the steady state, income of lenders approaches the critical income, thus technically bringing them close to become entrepreneurs themselves when in a 'large' rest of the world, an innite amount of investment projects is potentially realizable. Also, we will be interested how this structure of capital ows and ownership aects agents in the northern countries. Therefore, in the following, we will look at how the presented mechanism interacts with other dierences that are observable in reality. The result is, that the income diverging eect of FDI is even magnied by these dierences.
We will rst extend the analysis to a two-country-setting and then look at the interaction when the developing country does not only lag behind in capital endowment but also exhibits a lower total factor productivity. Both extensions are meant as a robustness check for the validity of the theory, as well as an elaboration of its predictions.
Two Country Setting
The two country setting follows straightfoward from the analysis in section 4. Consider, country 'South', as before in period T, integrates its capital markets with 'North', which is now of same size. Both countries have grown as in section 3, only that k N T > k S T . Free movement of investment equalizes capital stocks from period T + 1 on. The capital stock in each country is given by half of aggregate world savings, i.e.
The capital stock in North is smaller as compared to autarky when opening up, by exactly the amount that it is increased in South. The dynamics of national capital stocks then follow Solow-type growth for both countries parallelly:
However, income dynamics are disparate between the countries after opening up. As before, the credit market imperfection denes the critical income as given in (6), being the same for agents in both countries. (15) now reads
all new capital will be invested by northern agents. Dene the share of entrepreneurs in South who could pledge for
. This share will again not expand. In contrast, the share of entrepreneurs in North is given byk N t = 2k t −k S , which is increasing as long as the world economy is growing. GNI in country j is analogously given by
National income will increase for both countries with an increasing capital stock. However, South does not expand its share of entrepreneurs, whereas North does, by investing in both countries. South does -after an initial gain due to capital inows -not only grow slower than North in terms of income, it does so also slower than it would have under autarky at that level.
Steady State national incomes are given by:
National income in South is strictly lower than in North and, in the long run, again also lower than it would have been under autarky. South hence unambiguously loses by integrating its capital market with a more advanced country. North, in turn gains in the long run, even though pure workers initially lose due to the outow of productive capital. 19 The two-country equilibrium is even more stable than the small open economy case. Even though the income of a lender in South approaches that of a Northern lender and thus the critical income for investment in the steady state, this does not create investment chances in large scale. The reason is, that all entrepreneurs' income is still higher than that of lenders all over the world and the historical entrepreneurs will also in steady state re-take investment chances, not leaving much room for 'new' investment. The time dimension does enter here -not in that investment is taken, but in that incomes are distributed which determine borrowing, and thus investment possibilities.
TFP-Dierences
It is widely argued that capital ows to South are reduced because human capital, infrastructure, etc. in developing countries are not comparable to those in developed economies. By aecting the incentives for FDI, this will obviously interact with the mechanism described her.
Consider South exhibits lower total factor productivity than North, such
In autarky, South would converge to a steady state given by sδf (k * S,a ) =
Because the LHS is decreasing in k, k * S,a is lower than in the autarky steady state with higher TFP and thus lower than that in North.
If the two countries integrate their capital markets in T, capital returns from
, such that some FDI will still take place in South, as empirically relevant. From T+1, relative capital stocks are implicitly determined by f S (k S t ) = δf (k N t ) ≡f t . Consequently, k N t > k S t holds ∀t > T . The capital stock, and with it GDP, is increased in South, but still lower than in North after opening up.
Again, the critical income to just pledge investment is given byĨ t = r t+1 −λf t r t+1 s , which is equal for agents in both countries. Lenders' income in South is equivalently given by
It is thus again not sucient to pledge borrowing in open markets for southern agents. Note, that the dierence is even greater than with equal TFP, because a lower capital stock and lower overall productivity reduce wage income in comparison to lenders in North, in addition to the lower historical income. Consequently, as for identical countries, all investment after opening up will be pursued by northern agents, such thatk S t =k T +1 ≤ k S T . Steady state amounts of capital stocks are equal to autarky steady state amounts, k * S,o = k * S,a and k * N,o = k * . 20 GNI in either country j in the steady state read
Because as before,k S t < k * S holds, income in South is reduced by missed out investment returns (k * S −k S ) f (k * S )−r * 1−r * s , and analogously increased in North as an outcome of globalization in the long run. The result of diverging incomes (and disparate growth) induced by FDI still holds in this setting when countries are not identical and capital stocks installed do not equalize.
It holds even stronger, because incomes are then diverging and chances on investment further reduced for Southern agents. The underlying mechanism is not aected by the simplifying assumptions made earlier.
Conclusion and Outlook
We have seen that introducing imperfect capital markets into a neoclassical model of growth draws the attention the individual income distribution in the growing economy(-ies). In a very stylized way, the dierence between capital owners' and pure workers' incomes created by the capital market imperfection shows responsible for within-country dierences whereas dierences in 20 his is diret result from tht world svings hs to equl world investment E s in utrky E nd tensen9s snequlityF hroughout the growth proessD y the sme rgumentD pitl stoks instlled evolve s in utrky from their vlues t period CI onF the amount of productive capital installed creates within-group-betweencountries dierences. The natural trickle-down process that autarky growth brings along is disrupted when an economy opens up to international markets with more progressed countries. The reason is that FDI ows in, which raises the capital stock but at the same time reduces its marginal product and thus possibilities to invest. Because the poorer country's agents can not compete on the market for credit given this new conditions, the share of entrepreneurs will not expand anymore, despite an initially risen income due to the capital inow. In the long run, the missed out returns on investment lower national income in comparison to the autarky steady state.
Extending the model to a two-country analysis yields a pattern of parallel, but disparate growth. The story thus concurrently shows motives for richer countries to push poorer countries into integration to international markets even though this might be harmful for them: Obviously, the losses of the poor countries in the steady state are mirrored by gains for foreign investors (whereas the initial inow is the well known win-win situation of a static analysis).
It shows that the structure of capital ows and incomes of countries are mutually interdependent. This is dierent from saying that each type of capital ows has dierent idiosyncratic reasons to ow in either direction. Instead, an inow of FDI, outow of nancial capital and underdevelopment are different sides of the same story here.
To emphasize this basic mechanism, we have rst abstracted from any other dierences between countries other than the capital stock. This assumption is strong and hints at the possibility, that countries that lag behind could have developed in the same way as developed countries if they wouldn't have integrated their capital markets and let FDI ow into the country. This perspective has not been widespread in formal theories of economic growth before.
However, the assumption can be relaxed without altering the model's qualitative predictions. A developing country will also lose from integration when its productivity is lower and hence the inow of FDI, and with it the productive capital stock. In this case, the split is even clearer, because agents in this country would never be able to invest neither at home nor abroad in an international capital market. They would still have built up some capital with a closed nancial account.
However, even when accounting for productivity dierences, in the model, GDP is the same in the long run as it would be in autarky. It even jumps initially to that level. This is obviously simplifying. As Mankiw et al. (1992) have shown, the reason for a reduced productivity could well be dierences in human capital of poorer countries' working force. In the spirit of Galor & Zeira (1993) , this is even more probable if credit markets are imperfect, such that poorer agents cannot borrow to invest in schooling. Because FDI is unlikely to reduce returns to investment in human capital, an initial inow of capital could on the contrary rather loosen these constraints. Thus, the story could have two sides to it, depending on how the initial income gain is used. This might well be an explanation for the quite distinct experiences with capital market integration for developing economies.
Another reason for a reduced capital inow could be that the nal good is not freely traded. If it were costly to repatriate the prots from FDI, returns would have to be accordingly higher, thus invested capital (and GDP) lower. This has two eects: First, wage income is lower. Second, the return to investment of domestic agents is higher. Both work in opposite directions regarding chances on the market for credit. Depending on which eect dominates, trade costs might either safeguard poor countries against harmful FDI but jump-start growth, or might even worsen the eect of opening up by making producing for foreign countries even less protable. If an equilibrium with two-way capital ows still emerges when trade is costly, then the world as a whole would lose due to the dislocation of production from consumption sites.
From a policy perspective, both possible further extensions -human capital and trade costs -interact with the time dimension of the model described in the way that it may contribute to the decision about when to open best in the process of development.
The theory presented here is very stylized. By abstracting from many other mechanisms that are involved with international capital market integration, it does not claim that these are not at work. It is only to point out an additional aspect to be taken into consideration, both, from a theoretical point of view and from policy perspective. In the rst place, it draws the attention to the fact that the observed structure of two-way capital ows may be both result of and reason for income disparities between countries. As hinted at, it may in many ways interact with well-known results regarding capital market integration. It thus does add a novel argument by introducing a new dimension to the discussion about the welfare eects of globalization.
A Proof of Lemma 1
We want to show under which conditions the income of lenders, L I i t+1 = r t+1 sI i t + w(k t+1 ), is increasing over time. Dropping the individual index for readability, this condition is given by w t + r t sI t−1 > I t−1 ∀t. Rearranging yields:
The LHS is an upward opened parabola. Solving for its zeros yields I t−1;1,2 = 1 + sw t − sλf (k t ) 2s
Now, we have to make some case distinctions: a) For 1+swt−sλf (kt) 2s 2 < wt s , this has no solutions. Therefore for all I t−1 , The LHS of (20) i)1 + sw t − sλf (k t ) < 0. This is the case if the marginal product of capital is high and the wage rate rather low, i.e. especially likely in the beginning of the growth process. Because wt s > 0, both are in the negative range of I t−1 . Therefore, for all positive values of I t−1 , condition (20) still holds, and income is further increasing (Note, that rst period income is always positive). ii)If 1 + sw t − sλf (k t ) > 0, the zeros are in the positive range of I t−1 , such that for some incomes in between, we may have a decreasing income. Note, that this is the case only if the wage rate is suciently high compared to the return to physical capital, i.e. this would in any case only occur towards the end of the growth process.
We can see that, with the evolution of the return to capital throughout the growth process, the likelihood runs from case b)i) to case a) to case b)ii).
Note also, that even in the last case, if income is already suciently high (i.e. greater than the solutions to (21), it will further increase anyway. However, to avoid taxoconomical exposition, we can easily assume that even in the steady state, where (20) is most likely not to hold, it will still hold, i.e. we 
